Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1981

Calculation of Attorneys' Fees Awards in Title VII
Actions Against Private Defendants
Drucilla S. Ramey
Golden Gate University School of Law, dramey@ggu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
Recommended Citation
58 U. Detroit Mercy J. of Urban L. 609 (1981)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.

Calculation of Attorneys' Fees
Awards in Title VII Actions
Against Private Defendants
DRUCILLA STENDER RAMEY*

1. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 is a comprehensive
statute which has as its primary purpose assuring "equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."2
Although the governmental role in the Act's enforcement is substantial,
"the plaintiff [victim of discrimination] is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority.' "3
Central to this "private attorney general" function is Title VII's
provision for award of reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing parties:
"In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorneys'
fee as part of the costs ... ."4 In enacting the fees provision, Congress
recognized that most victims of discrimination are unable to afford legal
representation in vindicating their rights under the Act. Accordingly,
Congress sought to encourage attorneys to take these onerous cases by
mandating calculation of fee awards at levels applied in other areas of
equally complex federal litigation, including antitrust suits.5
Although plaintiffs' entitlement to an attorney's fee under the Act
has been liberally construed by the courts in light of the beneficial
remedial objectives of the legislation,6 trial judges have calculated these
• Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. B.A.,
Radcliffe College; J.D., Yale Law School. Professor Ramey is also Chair of the Board of
Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California. The author
gratefully acknowledges the research contribution of Eva Herzer.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 17 (1976l[hereinafter cited as the Act or Title VII].
2. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
3. Christianburg Garment Co. v EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978), quoting Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 401, 402 (1967).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
5. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS, 5908, 5913. See also notes 50-77 & accompanying text infra.
6. See Christianburg Garment Co. v EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978). Title VII
prevailing plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to attorneys' fees in all but special circumstances. Ordinarily, a prevailing defendant can be awarded attorney's fees only if plaintiffs action is adjudged frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. [d. at 422.
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fees at abnormally low levels.7 This has been accomplished through a
variety of mechanisms including: arbitrary elimination of documented
hours from fee requests; slashing of requested hourly rates; denial of
the multiplier often applied in such cases to reflect that the fee is contingent upon victory and its receipt is thereby delayed; and a refusal to
make upward adjustments for services of exceptionally high quality.s As
a result, while it is not unusual for courts to award hourly rates ranging
from $125.00 to $250.00 to successful antitrust and securities class action attorneys, their Title VII counterparts are fortunate to receive
hourly rates averaging $40.00 to $100.00 in their most successful and
complex cases.9 This extraordinary differential persists despite the comparably complex, lengthy, costly, and high-risk nature of the litigation
involved, and in defiance of the equally strong public policy considerations which underlie fee awards in both the commercial and civil rights
spheres.
Predictably, Title VII plaintiff attorneys increasingly have been
forced by economic necessity to resort to more traditional and
remunerative areas of practice. Many turn their expertise to Title VII
defense work, which pays handsomely and on a current basis, while
7. See, e.g., EEOC v. Strasburger, Price, 626 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1980)($10.60/hour);
EEOC v Safeway Stores, 597 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1980)($12.22/hour); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets
Co., 550 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1977)($27/hour); Kinsey v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, [1980]23
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 773 (D.D.C. 1978)($40-$65/hour for partners; $20-$45/hour for
associates); Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979)($40/hour);
Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976)($60/hour).
8. See cases cited in note 7 supra. See also Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc.,
603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978);
Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Waters v.
Heublein, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Bachman v. Pertschuk, [1980] 23 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cases 1046 (D.D.C. 1979).
9. For example, in the federal securities suit In re Equity Funding Corp. of
America Sec. Litigation, 438 F. Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977), attorneys were awarded
$6,458,310.00. In contrast, attorneys in a civil rights action, Gary v. Stone of La., 441 F.
Supp. 1121 (E.D. La. 1977), received only $205,000.00
A recent comprehensive survey of attorney's fee awards in 186 antitrust and
securities class actions found that plaintiffs' attorneys were awarded an average of $213.37
per hour. Those attorneys with recoveries in the highest recovery range ($10,233,000$218,000,000) averaged $249.90 per hour; those in the lowest recovery range ($102,720$650,000) averaged $102.34 per hour. All figures are based on 1980 deflated dollar values.
Attorney Fee Awards in Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, 6 CLASS ACTION REPORTS
82, 129 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Antitrust and Securities Class Actions].
An earlier unpublished survey of 140 district court fee awards established the mean
hourly rate awarded in private antitrust actions to be $181.00 while the mean hourly rate
awarded in Title VII cases was $40.00. Helfman, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: A
Statistical Survey of One Hundred and Forty Recent District Court Cases Involving Attorneys' Fees (1975)(project Submitted to the Faculty of Antioch School of Law), cited in
Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is Reasonable?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 310
n.l24 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees].
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others simply develop other specialties.10 Some practitioners, however,
have devoted considerable effort to the fees issue, and have successfully
convinced courts to compute fee awards on a basis which more closely
achieves the purposes of the Act.ll
In this article it will be argued that the legislative history of the attorneys' fees provision of Title VII requires that fee awards be computed by a method which produces fees sufficient to sustain a Title VII
bar, and that this may best be accomplished by a modified version of the
approach customarily used in the antitrust area.12
First addressed will be a brief overview of Title VII litigation problems, with emphasis on the complexity, duration, and high-risk nature of
the work involved. Then follows a discussion of the legislative purpose
of Title VII and its fee provisions, with particular attention to the
strong public policy considerations which must underlie judicial implementation of the fee award provisions of the Act. Next addressed
will be the comparative advantages of the two primary methods of fee
calculation employed by federal courts in complex litigation based,
respectively, on the Title VII case of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express I3 and the antitrust case of Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary COrp.I4 It will be argued that
the Lindy method should be adopted by courts in computing Title VII
fee awards. Lastly, two selected problem areas of implementation of
Lindy in the Title VII context will be discussed. Is
10. See, e.g., Declaration of Richard T. Seymour and Affidavit of Christopher D.
Burdick filed in support of plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs,
Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190 (N.D. Cal.
1980)[hereinafter cited as Declaration of Seymour and Affidavit of Burdick, respectively]. In
his Declaration, Mr. Seymour, a seasoned Title VII practitioner, states:
When I opened my solo law office on October 1, 1973, I took with me a number of
substantial class actions challenging employment discrimination ..•• In each of my
class actions, I provided my services to the plaintiffs and class members without
charge to them. This is common in the private enforcement of Title VII....
After three years and four months ... I closed my office in debt to a substantial
amount..•.
In my judgment, the fees awarded by the courts in litigated cases have often not been
sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the fee-award provisions of Title VII.
[d. at 3-4.
11. See Lewis v. FMC Corp., No. C-74-2327 RFP (SJ)(N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 12,
1980)(Order of attorneys' fees)(attorney and paralegal fees of $289,373.24); Westerlund v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(attorneys'
fees of $232,887); Neely v. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1980)(hourly rate of
$100 held appropriate for legal work of lead counsel).
12. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy 1).
13. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
14. 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
15. This article will not survey exhaustively the vast field of attorney's fee award
calculations in public interest cases. For a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the
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LITIGATION

The magnitude of the attorneys' fees awards problem in Title VII
actions must be viewed against the difficulties of the litigation involved.
Title VII class actions are extraordinarily complex, lengthy, risky, and
costly cases. The Act itself prohibits employment discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin by substantially all public
and private employers, labor unions, employment agencies, and joint
labor-management committees controlling apprenticeship or other training. Barred is discrimination in virtually all aspects of employment, including recruitment, hiring, testing, job assignment, compensation,
benefits, hours, promotion, training, discipline, seniority rights, termination, and retaliation. 16
The Act relies on a labyrinth of administrative exhaustion procedures,17 requiring initial recourse by aggrieved individuals to the
agency created to administer Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The charge must then temporarily be referred to an appropriate state or local agency, if any, after which the complainant is required to exhaust EEOC internal administrative
remedies. ls Ultimate recourse to federal district court than may be
taken by the complainant, individually or on behalf of a class, or the action may be prosecuted by the EEOC. 19 The already complex task of the
complainant is greatly aggravated by the constant change in interpretation of these requirements occasioned by regulatory and judicial
action. 2D Finally, plaintiffs must comply with procedural prerequisites

problem areas in the field, see R. LARSEN, FEDERAL COURT AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (to
be published Summer 1981) [hereinafter cited as LARSEN]; Court A warded Attorneys' Fees,
supra note 9; Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975); Comment, Calculation of a Reasonable Award of Attorneys' Fees
Under the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 JOHN MAR. L. REV. 331 (1979·80).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to (d) (1976).
17. Procedures governing federal employees are particularly cumbersome. Responsibility for their administration was recently transferred from the Civil Service Commission to the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976)(Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1978, effective
Jan. I, 1979)_
18. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.1-_74 (1977)_
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to -5(k) (1976). See generally B. SCHLEI & P_ GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 769-826 (1976) and Supplement 207-17 (1979); see also
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 64 (1980). Since 1972, the EEOC has
been empowered to bring civil actions or to intervene in those brought by private parties,
but lacks the vast gamut of civil and criminal sanctions available under the antitrust and
securities acts. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5-(f)(l) (1975) and 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a)-(c)(1975).
20_ See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1-.74, as amended 1978, which established new EEOC
procedures for the filing, drafting, investigation, settlement, dismissal, determination, and
final processing of charges under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to-5(c) (1976). See also Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); Delaware State College v. Ricks, _
U.S. _ , 101 S_
Ct. 498 (1980); United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)(timeliness decisions substantially affecting plaintiffs' right to sue under Title VII).
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and limitation periods of other statutes commonly pleaded in conjunction with Title VII.21
Class action plaintiffs additionally must grapple with all the
problems attendant upon class certification and management under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22 Until the Supreme
Court's recent decision in East Texas Motor Freight, Inc. v. Rodriguez,23
courts had long held appropriate under Title VII "across-the-board"
class actions by one or more. named plaintiffs representing one or more
protected groups, attacking the entire gamut of an employer's policies
and practices. These actions were often prosecuted on a multi-facility,
city-wide, state-wide, or even national basis,24 requiring a commensurately broad-based discovery and trial approach. Although courts are
more wary of certifying post-Rodriguez across-the-board class actions,25
they have continued to permit these actions where adequate class
representation can be shown. 26 Nevertheless, the possible conflicts of interest among sub-classes, as well as the enormous expenditure of time
and money they entail, have led many plaintiffs' attorneys to narrow the
scope of the suit.
The constant state of flux in the applicable substantive law aggravates the inherently cumbersome nature of class actions prosecuted
under the Act. The Supreme Court began substantive construction of
the Act in 1971,27 and theories of proof under Title VII continue to be
uncertain. In 1976-1977, the Supreme Court issued five decisions which
dramatically altered Title VII law in the areas of seniority discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, class action certification, timeliness of
21. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206d (1976); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976); Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871,42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
23. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). The Supreme Court in Rodriguez held that the named plaintiffs in that action, which had never been certified by the trial court, were not discriminated
against and, therefore, given the peculiar procedural posture of the case, were unable to
represent a class. [d. at 403-04.
24. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975) (nationwide scope
of action); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Carr v. Conoco Plastics,
Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 951 (1970)(across-the-board class actions endorsed); Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507, 513-14 (N.D. Tex.
1978)(employees at one facility may represent workers in separate plant as well as applicants, as long as the interests of the class are adequately represented).
25. Chavez v. Temple Union High School Dist. #213, 565 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1977);
Ricks v. Schlesinger, [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 694 (D.D.C. 1979); Talley v. Hoechst
Fibers Indus., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 580 (D.S.C. 1979)(class action scope limited).
26. See, e.g., Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
27. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a unanimous Court held that
facially neutral employment practices which could be shown to have a disparate impact or
effect on blacks violate Title VII regardless of the subjective intent of the employer, unless
the employer can demonstrate that such practices bear a manifest relationship to job performance. [d. at 431-32.
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filing of suit, and standards of statistical proof of discrimination. 28 These
decisions and others have marked a growing conservatism in the
Court's interpretation of plaintiffs rights under Title VII.29 This trend
has significantly augmented the plaintiffs' burden in these actions, requiring litigators continually to develop novel alternative theories of
discrimination adapted to the fluctuating legal standards and fact patterns posed by contemporary discrimination law.30
Even in areas where the law is relatively stable, Title VII.class actions present enormous problems of proof. Moreover, these difficulties
have multiplied in recent years as plaintiffs have begun to pursue the
so-called "second generation" of Title VII suits. As stated by one
district court judge:
If there ever was a time of facile Title VII litigation, it surely
ended with the demise of intentional violations of equal
employment opportunity. Today's parade of Title VII cases
present more and more subtle manifestations of discrimination. Proof of invidious practices becomes more difficult as the
ability to separate the real violation from the unfounded suspicion grows harder. This is especially so since many employers
and unions ... have made substantial good faith efforts toward
eliminating racial distinctions from the workforce. 3!

28. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States 43? U.S. 299 (1977)(standards of
statistical proof); Eastern Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395
(1977)(class actions); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977)(seniority); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977)(pregnancy); United
Airlines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)(timeliness).
29. Griggs itself may be in jeopardy. The Court in International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), reversed every circuit which had ruled on the issue
holding that a seniority system does not violate Title VII absent a showing, in essence, that
the system was the product of intentional discrimination. Id. at 352-53.
President Reagan's EEOC transition team has recommended that the proof of
discriminatory intent should be applied to all employment practices. Lubin, Reagan's Advisors Accuse the EEOC of "Racism," Suggest Big Cutback, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1981, § 2,
at 21, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Reagan's Advisors].
30. See, e.g., Croker v. Boeing, 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1192 (E.D. Pa_ 1977)(plaintiffs'
case greatly affected by recent Supreme Court cases); Smith v. Union Oil Co., [1979] 18 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1183, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 1978)(court noted plaintiffs' difficult position because
the case went to trial at a time when the state of the law governing class' burden of proof in
Title VII class actions was in flux); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, [1980] 21 Fair Empl. Prac_
Cas. 168, 169 (N.D. Ga. 1979)(states that Eastern Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez
431 U.S. 395 (1977), United Airlines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), and International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) "constitute a jurisprudential triptych setting forth entirely new rules for Title VII and Section 1981 litigation"); Allen v. Terminal Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (1980)(plaintiffs required to deal with "constantly
changing law, especially in the areas of union liability and seniority").
31. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 99 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Boyd v.
Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
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Title VII actions today can entail discovery, review, synthesis, and
evidentiary introduction of millions of items of data, organized within
abstruse statistical models designed to illustrate discrimination under
the Act. The nature of these statistical showings has become increasingly complex as discrimination itself has become an increasingly subtle
phenomenon.32
In light of these characteristics, Title VII class actions are
characterized as extraordinarily risky, lengthy, and expensive undertakings. Because Title VII plaintiffs are normally unable to pay even the
costs of suit, let alone fees, and because the Act provides for attorneys'
fees awards only to prevailing plaintiffs, fees in Title VII lawsuits are
entirely contingent in nature. Title VII defendants, by contrast, are
often large corporations with the resources to marshall large, well-paid
law firms in their defense. These firms often wage unrelenting "wars of
attrition" at all stages of the litigation.33
Each major stage in these cases poses a high degree of risk. The
risk of failure at the class certification stage has increased substantially,
both as a result of judicial response to the Supreme Court's decision in
East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v Rodriguez,34 and because of a
growing tendency on the part of trial judges to require far more
substantial evidentiary showings by plaintiffs in support of class certification.3s Moreover, under recent Supreme Court decisions, plaintiffs
may not appeal the denial of a class action certification motion until the
conclusion of the case, which must necessarily first be prosecuted to
completion on a non-class basis.36 In a 1980 survey of 357 class actions
filed in one district between 1970 and 1979, three percent of the cases
studied had proceeded to trial on the merits. 37
Plaintiffs' risk of loss at trial is substantial in Title VII cases, and is
particularly high in class actions where counsel, as fiduciaries for the
32. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); EEOC v.
Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Union Oil Co., [1979] 18 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1183, 1185 (N.D. Tex. 1980); see also Vuyanaich v. Republic Nat'l Bank,
[1981] 24, Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 127 (N.D. Tex. 1980)(132·page opinion largely devoted to
detailed review of statistical methods of proof in an across· the-board class action). See
generally Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLO. L. REV. 702 (1980).
33. See, e.g., Jones v. Glitch, 489 F. SUpp. 990, 996 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1980)(defense attorneys mounted a "never give an inch defense").
34. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
35. [d. See also Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 272-81 (4th
Cir. 1980); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
36. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
37. Chatty, The Question of Job Bias, San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, Nov.
18, 1979, California Living Magazine at 7 [hereinafter cited as Chatty]. The author found
that 15% were either dismissed for failure to prosecute or other procedural reasons, or consolidated with other actions; 20% more were settled prior to class certification. In 26% of
the remaining cases, the court either denied class certification or granted defense motions
for summary judgment. [d.
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class, must press all possible theories of liability on behalf of
unrepresented class members.3s Plaintiffs must prevail not only on the
merits (Stag~ I), but subsequently on the equally problematic relief
stage of the case (Stage IIl.39 All too often, proof of individual claims of
relief in Stage II proceedings develops into a series of mini-trials on the
merits.40 It should be noted that both liability and proof issues are particularly complex in actions brought against federal, state, or local entities.41
Even in the event of success by a plaintiff through both Stage I
and Stage II of trial, appeals from final orders are common. Although
many Title VII class actions are settled prior to judgment, it is not
unusual for one or more persons to file and litigate objections to such
decrees. 42 Moreover, litigation of attorneys' fees issues, left open by
many decrees, may occupy several more years.43 Lastly, plaintiffs' attorneys often are responsible for monitoring effective compliance with a
court order or consent decree over a period of years following conclusion of the case on the merits.
In light of these factors, it is not unusual for Title VII class actions
to require several thousands of hours of attorney and paralegal time
simply to establish liability. Many cases drag on for five to ten years or
longer if the case involves a substantively fluctuating area of the law.
As recently noted by the fifth circuit in its fourth consideration of a
Title VII class action originally filed in 1966:

38. See, e.g., Allen v. Terminal Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (N.D. Tex.
1980)(plaintiffs' counsel would have been remiss in duty as representatives of the class had
they not pressed all available theories warranted in light of the law at that time); Jones v.
Glitch, 489 F. Supp. 990, 996 (N.D. Tex. 1980)(single·plaintiff cases exhibit a rather low rate
of success).
39. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361-62 (1977).
40. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335 !D.N.J. 1979); see also
Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1973)("formula" settlement of
Stage 2 claims impermissible).
41. In the House Report on the [1976] Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, the
Committee noted that: "[I]n some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses available
only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy." H.R. REP. No. 1558,
94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976). See generally M. Dunlap, Attorneys' Fees Against Government Defendants: Economics Requires a New Proposal, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (1979).
See also the recently enacted Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96- 481, 49 U.S.L.W.
193-96 (Jan. 13, 1981)(to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2412), which establishes guidelines for
award for attorneys' fees to certain prevailing litigants against the federal government, but
by its terms limits its application to exclude cases already covered by federal fee-shifting
statutes such as "the Civil Rights Act .... in which Congress indicated a specific intent to
encourage vigorous enforcement ...." H. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980).
42. See Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978); Mandujano
v. Basic Vegetable Prod., Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976); Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F.
Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
43. See Neely v. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980).
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The length of litigation in complex Title VII class actions
often rivals that of even the most notorious antitrust cases. In
the instant case, we encounter another judicial paleolithic
museum piece .... Nonetheless, we are undaunted by the
crushing weight of accumulated record and remain mindful
that the Court must not diverge from the direction chartered
for us by the Title VII compass, no matter how long and difficult the journey. We, thus, address ourselves to the fourth
appearance of this case, determined to ensure that the victims of illegal racial discrimination receive the full measure
of relief which the law accords them.44
The resulting cost of these actions is immense, both in terms of
years of time expended by an attorney who has no assurance of payment, and as measured by the financial outlay entailed. In one recent
case, for example, plaintiffs requested compensation for over 2,770
hours of attorney time and 244 hours of paralegal work, as well as reimbursement for over $90,000 in costS.45 These costs included statistical
and computer resources and experts, and thousands of dollars in travel
expenses occasioned by out-of-town depositions and other discovery.4s
These hours and costs would have spiraled even higher had the case
culminated in trial and appeal, rather than in settlement.47 Because of
the contingency nature of Title VII class actions, the plaintiffs' law firm
was forced to prosecute the case for over four years with no assurance
of compensation. As a result of its experience in this and other cases,
that law firm, the most prominent of the handful of San Francisco firms
doing plaintiffs' Title VII work, has left the field. 4s The staggering
burdens involved in Title VII class action litigation are summarized in
the recent Declaration of a Title VII lawyer forced to close his office
deep in debt.
The problem is that successful prosecution of a fair employment class action can require two or three thousand hours'
work simply through the decision of the trial court, and
paralegal time can easily amount to an additional couple of
44. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1168 (5th Cir.
1978)(EEOC charge filed Nov. 22, 1965; suit filed 1966; case still in progress). See also, Allen.
v. Terminal Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(eight years from original filing
of suit through attorneys' fees decision on appeall; Freeman v. Motor Convoy, [1980]21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 168 (N.D. Ga. 1979)(class certified 1974; trial order 1975; vacated 1978 in
light of Teamsters decision; relitigation of most issues ordered 1980); Bowe v. Colgate
Palmolive Co., 443 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind. 1977)(fee decision in case spanning eleven years,'
two appeals, and 387 docket entries).
45. Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. C-76-798 RFP (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5,
1980)(Memorandum and Order 2, 10-11).
46. [d.
47. [d.
48. Affidavit of Burdick supra note 10.
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thousand hours' work. The expense of prosecuting a complex
Title VII class action frequently is in the $30,000 - $50,000
range, through the decision of the trial court [as to liability] ....
Because the awards are ordinarily not collectable until after
findings on liability have been affirmed and because it can
take several years before such findings are even entered by
the trial court, the prosecution of plaintiffs' Title VII cases on
a contingent basis frequently involves an enormous financial
drain on counsel. Because of this drain, I have been informed
by a number of plaintiffs' Title VII attorneys that they are
reducing the proportion of their time that they spend on the
prosecution on such cases.49
In light of the prohibitively costly nature of Title VII litigation, the
courts must provide the bar with the realistic prospect of substantial attorneys' fee awards upon successful completion of a case. Private enforcement of Title VII will otherwise cease.
III.

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF TITLE

VII's

FEE AWARD PROVISIONS

In calculating fee awards under Title VII, trial judges must
recognize and implement the' strong public policy considerations
underlying this legislation. Awards in Title VII actions should thus
parallel judgments in antitrust and security cases.
Both Title VII and the corporate policing statutes deal with injuries of an economic nature. 50 Title VII was enacted as a central component of the omnibus civil rights legislation passed by Congress in
response to the acute racial crisis of the early 1960s. As expressed by
President Kennedy in his Special Message to Congress of June 19,1963:
The result of continued Federal legislative inaction will be
continued if not increased racial strife-causing the leadership on both sides to pass from the hands of reasonable and
49. Declaration of Seymour, supra note 10, at 4; Declaration of Jules Gordon,
Associate Regional Attorney, EEOC, filed in support of plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981) 24 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
50. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)(Title VII); Mills v.
Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)(securities); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469 (1940)(antitrust); In re Gypsum Cases, 346 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1974)(antitrust); See
also Remarks of Senator Humphrey in urging passage of Title VII:
The shameful fact is that educated Negroes often are denied the chance to get
jobs for which they are trained and qualified ....
Discrimination in employment ... is also harmful to the nation as a whole....
So, discrimination in employment is not only costly in terms of what it does to a
human being, his general nature, his attitude toward his country and himself, but it is
costing the American economy billions of dollars in loss of income.
110 CONGo REC. 13091 (1964) reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1224 (1970).
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responsible men to the purveyors of hate and violence, endangering domestic tranquility, retarding our nation's
economic and social progress and weakening the respect with
which the rest of the world regards US. 51
Congress' purpose in enacting Title VII was that of "eradi<;ating
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through pa.st discrimination."52
Enforcement of both Title VII and its antitrust and securities
counterparts is predicated on a combination of public and private enforcement efforts, but the private plaintiff plays a central role in both
areas. The United States Supreme Court highlighted early the role of
the private plaintiff in enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and
subsequently applied its reasoning specifically to Title VII.
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was
evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the
Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a
means of securing broad compliance with the law.
When [a plaintiff] obtains an injunction, he does so not
for himself alone but also as a "private attorney general" vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority.53
The broad role of the private plaintiff in the statutory scheme resulted
from the failure of civil rights advocates to convince Congress to vest
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), the enforcement agency under the Act, with cease-and-desist powers, such as those
exercised by the National Labor Relations Board.54
Antitrust and securities legislation similarly depends upon the initiative of private plaintiffs to achieve its goals,55 but the role of the
51. 109 CONGo REC. 1157 (1963).
52. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
53. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968)(Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)), cited with approval in Christianburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-18 (1978)(Title VIIl; New York Gaslight Club, Inc.
v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980)(Title VIIl.
54. See section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746, 118 CONGo REC. 7564-65 (1972). Until
the 1972 amendments, the EEOC did not even have the right to bring suit. Under the 1972
amendments, United States Department of Justice's power to bring "pattern and practice"
suits under § 707 of the Act was finally transferred to the EEOC and § 706 was amended to
empower the EEOC to bring suit based on changes filed by EEOC or private changing parties. However, under the 1972 amendments, the Commission's administrative powers continued to be limited to those of conciliation and persuasion. See M. Heins, The FourteenYear Furor Over Equal Employment, 6 WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY 71, 76 (Center
for the Study of Public Policy, Inc., eds.)(1978) [hereinafter cited as The Fourteen-Year
Furor].
55. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15h (Supp. 1977), as amended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
of 1976. Pub.L. No. 94-435. § 301. 90 Stat. 1344 (private civil suit for treble damages for an-
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respective enforcement agencies under these acts is considerably
greater than that of the EEOC. As noted by one writer, prior to the
1972 Amendments to Title VII, the EEOC "could only investigate complaints and attempt conciliation -- 'a poor, enfeebled thing.' "56 By 1978,
lack of resources, leadership, and governmental commitment had
culminated in a backlog of 130,000 unprocessed charges and a minimal
docket of cases.57 A brief and controversial period of vitality under new
leadershi p 58 is apparently about to end with the advent of the Reagan
administration. 59
By contrast, the antitrust and securities laws provide for and have
resulted in energetic civil and criminal enforcement by governmental
agencies. 60 The Securities and Exchange Commission is widely regarded
as the single strongest agency in the Federal government.61 Similarly, as
noted by one expert, "[t]he Antitrust Division [of the United States
Department of Justice] is a law office, a good one with a strong tradition
of high competence that transcends and perhaps inhibits programmatic
change."62
In both the civil rights and commercial spheres, however, the
"private attorney general" function is central, and realized only if competent counsel can be persuaded to undertake plaintiffs' cases. Adequate attorneys' fees awards have long been recognized by Congress
and the courts as a chief incentive to securing this representation. 63
titrust violation); Comment, Shareholders' Derivative Suits to Enforce a Corporate Right
of Action Against Directors Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 578 (1966).
56. The Fourteen-Year Furor, supra note 54, at 76_
57. Id. at 76, 77.
58_ Id. at 76.
59. It has already been reported that President Reagan's EEOC transition team has
recommended an EEOC budget reduction and the imposition of a one-year freeze on EEOC
lawsuits and regulations_ Reagan's Advisors, supra note 29_
60. For a full discussion of civil and criminal governmental enforcement of the antitrust laws by the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal
Trade Commission, see L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 751-69 (1977) [hereinafter cited ANTITRUST].
For discussion of governmental enforcement of the Securities Acts, see Jacobs, Judicial and
Administrative Remedies Available to the S.E. C. for Breaches of Rule lOb-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 397 (1979); Mathews, A.L.L Proposed Federal Securities Code: Part XVAdministration and Enforcement, 30 VAND. L. REV. 465, 482 (1977); Note, The Securities
and Exchange Commission: An Introduction to the Enforcement of the Criminal Provisions
of the Federal Securities Laws, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Securities and Exchange Commission].
61. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 60, at 143; [Oct. 6, 1976] SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 372 at A-5.
62. Antitrust, supra note 60, at 752.
63. One district court, in construing Title VII's attorney's fee provisions, noted:
The court approaches [the award of Title VII fees] with an awareness of the importance that adequate fee awards play in the vindication of the rights guaranteed by
Title VII. Litigation in this area often involves extraordinarily complex legal and factual issues that many attorneys would simply be unable to handle successfully. The important individual and societal issues at stake in such litigation may not be adequately
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The basis for judicial award of attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII cases is found in the statute itself, which provides in
relevant part:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.54
Title VII's contemporaneous legislative history states that the purpose
of the fees provision is to facilitate meritorious suits by persons of
limited means.65
protected unless attorneys possessing the requisite skills can be induced to take Title
VII cases.•..[T)he awards must be sufficient to make such representation financially
attractive to highly qualified attorneys.
Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 406 F. Supp. 828,
830 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also United States v. Operating Engineers, [1974] 6 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 984, 985 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Courts have similarly predicated fee awards in antitrust and securities class actions on the need to stimulate legal representation of persons
bringing cases involving "corporate therapeutics." Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375,
396 (1970). See also Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Knutson v. Daily
Review, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1979), quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (private enforcement of substantive antitrust
policy is "bulwark of antitrust enforcement").
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). Title VII is one of approximately 125 federal
statutes which authorize discretionary or mandatory fee-shifting to prevailing parties or to
prevailing plaintiffs alone. 3 FED. ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS REP., (No.5) at 2 (August 1980).
These statutes constitute exceptions to the American rule, whereby eacli party bears his or
her own attorney's fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975). Plaintiffs who prevail at trial on Clayton Act antitrust violations are mandatorily
awarded attorneys' fees from the defendant. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976). Plaintiffs in antitrust class actions who successfully secure a settlement benefiting others similarly
situated by creation of a "common fund" or a "substantial benefit" are awarded fees pursuant to a second exception to the American rule. In this situation, the courts exercise their
equitable powers to assess fees from non-parties who have benefited from the creation of
such fund or benefit. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). Prevailing plaintiffs in shareholder's
derivative actions brought under § 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are also
awarded fees from the benefited corporation under the "common fund" exception. Mills v.
Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). Fees are awardable to prevailing parties under
several of the federal securities laws, although these statutes are not designed to encourage "private attorneys general" under this act. See § l1(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 73(k)(e) (1976), and §§ 9(e) and 18(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i)(e) and 78(r)(a) (1976). Commentaries on attorney's fee
awards in antitrust and securities actions include Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities
Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP. L. 267 (1978); Springer, Fee Awards in Antitrust Litigation. 44 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 97 (1975); Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, supra note 9; Attorney Fees: Awards in Class Recoveries, 3 CLASS ACTION REPORTS
154 (1974).
65. 110 CONGo REC. 12724 (1964). See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 420 (1978).
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The legislative purpose behind this statute is found not only in the
legislative history of Title VII, but also in the more extensive history of
the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, an act explicity intended by Congress to be governed by the same standards as those
prevailing under Title VII.66 Congress further underlined the importance of attorneys' fees to secure enforcement of public interest
statutes, like Title VII, in its passage of the 1976 Act. As stated in the
Senate report:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the
citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money
with which to hire a lawyer. There are very few provisions in
our Federal laws which are self-executing. Enforcement of
the laws depends upon governmental action and, in some
cases, on private action through the courts. If the cost of
private enforcement actions becomes too great, there will be
no private enforcement. If our civil rights laws are not to
become mere hollow pronouncements, which the average
citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases.67
The problems in implementation of this congressional purpose do
not stem from overly restrictive rules concerning entitlement to fees in
Title VII cases. Despite the discretionary language of the Act's fee provision, plaintiffs' entitlement to fees has long been liberally construed
by courts in light of the beneficial purposes of the Act. Thus, award of
fees has been held to be one crucial aspect of complete relief under the
Act, necessary for the fulfillment of federal goals, and mandatorily
awarded absent "special circumstances" which would render such an
award unjust. 68 Consistent with this liberal approach, plaintiffs have
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in
[1976] U.s. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912. "It is intended that the standards for
awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act." Id.
67. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 5908, 5913. The 1976 Act was passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision
in Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Alyeska barred, with
a few exceptions, award of fees by federal courts in the exercise of their equitable powers,
absent express congressional authorization. The 1976 Act provides for discretionary award
of attorneys' fees, as part of costs, to prevailing parties in actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 1681a-b (1976); 26 U.S.C. § 7401 (1976); and
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
68. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978), quoting
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968); See also Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) citing Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)
("Where racial discrimination is concerned, the [district] court has not merely the power but
the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory ef·
fects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future").
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held to be "prevailing" not only upon securing trial victory, but also
when they have secured substantial benefits for themselves and/or their
class through settlement, or through activity which serves as a catalyst
to produce voluntary compliance with the Act by a defendant.69 Additionally, the Supreme Court recently held that a district court action
may be brought to recover attorneys' fees for a complainant who
prevails in state administrative and judicial proceedings pursuant to
Title VII administrative remedies provisions.70 Finally, the EEOC
recently published guidelines which grant prevailing plaintiffs fees for
the prosecution of federal administrative proceedings under Title VII.71
In contrast to the liberal judicial standards applied in determining
eligibility for attorneys' fees under Title VII, the standards applied by
courts in calculating the amounts of fee awards have operated to
discourage, rather than to encourage, qualified attorneys from representing the victims of discrimination.72 This result runs counter to
Congress' legislative purpose in enacting the Act's fees provision, as
supplemented by the detailed congressional findings accompanying the
1976 Act. 73
The Senate Report on that Act articulated three fundamental
statements of congressional policy. First: "It is intended that the
amount of fees awarded under [the Act] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation,
such as antitrust cases, and not be reduced because the rights involved
may be non-pecuniary in nature."74 Second, the Senate expressed its intention that fees in public interest cases be calculated on the same basis
as that employed by private practitioners in billing their fee-paying
clients, that is, "for all time reasonably expended on a matter."75
Third, the Senate cited with approval three cases which it found to
have produced "fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel,
but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys."76 None of these cases
69. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980)(settlementl; Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438
F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971)(catalyst); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th
Cir. 1970). But see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, reh. denied, 448 U.S. 913 (1980)(par·
ty not "prevailing" for purposes of interim fee award until he/she has established entitle·
ment to some relief on the merits of the claim).
70. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 71 (1980).
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(c) (1980).
72. See notes 7·9 & accompanying text supra.
73. Not only is the Senate Report on the 1976 Act by its terms applicable to Title
VII, see note 66 & accompanying text supra, but the Supreme Court also recently recogniz·
ed its applicability to Title VII cases in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54,
70 n.9 (1980); see also Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 973 (D.C.
Cir.1980).
74. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE & AD.
NEWS 5913.
75. ld.
76. ld. citing Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 19741; Davis v.
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relies on the traditional analysis customarily applied by courts in public
interest cases. Rather, each lays the basis for awarding substantial fees
by use of criteria which expressly recognize the complexity, contingent
nature, and public importance of public interest cases.77
As discussed in the following section, these and other cases
demonstrate the need for enlightened judicial implementation of a feesetting formula which more effectively implements the above congressional directives than that customarily employed by courts at present.

IV.

Two METHODS OF FEE SETTING-THE ADVANTAGES
OF THE LINDY ApPROACH

In calculating statutorily and equitably based attorneys' fees
awards in complex federal cases, most courts currently adhere to
guidelines established by one or both of two cases: Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express Inc. 78 and Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v American
Radiator and Standard Sanitary COrp.79 The fifth circuit in Johnson attempted to insure against award of inadequate fees in Title VII cases by
requiring trial judges to justify their awards by documented consideration of twelve factors: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney
because of acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the
fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.so These factors
County of Los Angeles, [1975] 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 244 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Swann v.
Charlotte·Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
77. In light of the difficulty and excellent results of a complex Title VII class action,
the court in Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975] 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 244 (C.D. Cal.
1973), (1) set a generous hourly rate for the two experienced lead counsel in the case,
despite their employment by a non·profit public interest law firm, (2) refused to reduce the
award because of issues ultimately lost or dropped from the case, and (3) augmented the
base award by a 10% bonus to compensate for the case's difficulty and results. In Stanford
Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the district judge, expressly adopting the
fee·calculation formula used in antitrust cases, augmented by 21 % the base fee award in a
complex constitutional case on the basis of the contingency nature of compensation, quality
of the legal work, novel issues, and public importance of the results obtained. In Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975), the trial court awarded
generous fees in a major school desegregation case taking into account inter alia similar
fees paid to defense counsel, as well as the length, excellent results, and social importance
of the case and immense hardship suffered by the plaintiffs attorneys in pursuing the action.
78. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)(Title VII).
79. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973)(antitrust).
80. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 19741
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were modelled after, and closely parallel, those established by the
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility.81
The judicial concern reflected by the third circuit in Lindy was the
limitation of trial court awards of excessively high fees in plaintiffs' antitrust actions yielding high monetary results.82 Accordingly, the Lindy
formula, which has come to be employed by most courts in antitrust and
other business litigation, disapproves fees calculated on the basis of a
fixed percentage of the monetary recovery in the case. Rather, trial
courts are directed to calculate fees on the basis of a prescribed formula, by which a comparatively objective base figure is first calculated
by multiplying the number of hours worked by a reasonable hourly rate.
This "lodestar" figure which emphasizes the attorney's actual time expenditure on the case may then be adjusted by a "multiplier" (e.g., 1.5%
of the "lodestar") reflecting the court's more subjective evaluation of
the increase merited by the contingency nature of the case, and, where
appropriate, the adjustment merited by the exceptional quality of the
attorney's services.83
Until recently, the Johnson analysis, or a similar open-ended
"multi-factor" approach, has ordinarily been adopted by courts for the
purpose of calculating fees in public interest cases, including those
brought under Title VII.84 Trial court opinions under Johnson typically
consist of listing all Qr some of the twelve factors, accompanied by a few
conclusory observations regarding each factor, and culminating in a flat
dollar award, no part of which is specifically attributable to anyone factor. 85 This process is inherently susceptible to great abuse, which may
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-18,
Disciplinary Rule 240-6 (B).
82. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir.1974); Knutson v.
Daily Review, Inc., 479 F.Supp. 263, 267 (N.D. Cal. 1979); In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp.
959, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1977); TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 312
F.Supp. 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afl'd and modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d 51, 79 (2d
Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, sub. nom. Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA, Inc., 409 U.S. 363
(1973).
83. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d 161, 166-69 (3d Cir. 1973); see also, Lindy II, 540 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir.1976).
84. See Neely v. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980)(Johnson); Walston v.
School Bd. of City of Suffolk, 566 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1977)(ABA Code); Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1977)(Johnson); Kerr v. Screen Extras
Guild, Inc. 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975)(Johnson); Walters v. Wisconsin Steelworkers of
Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974)(ABA Code).
85. For criticisms of this approach see Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 967, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1980); King v. McCord, 621 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1980); Davis
v. Fletcher, 598 F.2d 469, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1979). Courts continue, however, to issue conclusory opinions. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235, 242-43 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 904 (1979); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F.
Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1974), afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.
1976).
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or may not be corrected on appeal. In one 1977 case, for example, the appellate court reversed an award of $300, representing $4.50 per hour, in
a largely successful fifteen plaintiff action. 86 That same year, however,
another appellate court found no abuse of discretion in a trial court's
award of $27.00 per hour to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs.87
The tremendous latitude afforded the trial courts through the
Johnson approach provides greater opportunity for some judges to express, via their fee decisions, their own prejudices. First, as aIJ overwhelmingly white, male, middle-class group, federal district court
judges are often unfamiliar with or unsympathetic toward the interests
represented by Title VII attorneys, their clients, and their cases.58 As
expressed by one unusually candid judge in the context of a major
school desegregation case:
The case was difficult. The first and greatest hurdle was the
district court. The judge, who was raised on a cotton farm
which had been tended by slave labor in his grandfather's
time, started the case with the uninformed assumption that
no intentional segregation was being practiced ... , that the
aims of the suit were extreme and unreasonable, and that a
little bit of a push was all that the Constitution required of
the court. The plaintiffs ... demonstrated that segregation in
Charlotte was no accident, and that it was still the systematic
practice of the school administration and the community at
large. These and other factors ... produced a reversal in the
original attitude of the district court.89
A second judicial prejudice which is relatively uncontrolled in fee
decisions under Johnson, is a perception of Title VII litigators as zealots
86. Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788,554 F.2d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 1977).
87. Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 372-73 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Neely
v. City of Grenada, 623 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1980)(award of $45. per hour for in·court hours held
an abuse of discretion, but award of $35 per hour for all other legal work affirmed in successful across-the-board class action against entire municipality); EEOC v. Strasburger,
Price, [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1279, 1281 (5th Cir. 1980)(no abuse of discretion in
trial court award of $2500 attorney's fees for over 236 hours of work by law professor in
successful intervention in Title VII case).
88. In February 1981, 450 out of a total of 516 district court judges were white
males (87%); out of 132 circuit court judges, 10 were black, 2 were Chicano, and 11 were
women. Telephone conversation with Sheila Joy, Statistician United States Dep't of Justice
Statistical Dep't, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 6, 1981). In 1979, of the 525 active federal judges,
only 29 were racial minorities and only 10 were women. Hearings on Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 53
(1979)(prepared statement by Charles R. Halpern).
89. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483, 484-85 (W_D_N.C_
1975).
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who do not expect or deserve to be compensated comparably with their
more affluent equals in the commercial bar. This attitude was most
clearly expressed by courts espousing the early-discredited theory that
attorneys employed by public interest or legal aid firms either should
not be compensated at all, or not receive compensation on th~ same
basis as those employed in the private bar.90 The most recent permutation of this theory appeared in the panel opinion in Copeland v. Marshall, recently reversed en bane by the District of Columbia circuit.9l
The panel construed Johnson to require that awards of attorneys' fees
in Title VII cases against federal defendants should represent compensation only for actual costs incurred by their law firm on the case, including attorneys' salaries, plus a "reasonable and controllable profit."92
The circuit's rejection of this theory was based both on its inherent administrative difficulties, and, more importantly, on its obvious adverse
impact on public interest lawyers and law firms. The court explained
that the cost-plus formula will yield different fees than the market value
approach where the plaintiff is represented by a public interest law
firm.93 Such firms often represent their clients for low fees or no fee at
all. Since a cost-plus calculation focuses on the attorneys' salaries rather
than the value of the services rendered, the individual attorney is compensated at a rate far below the market price under this approach.
Noting that Congress had expressly mandated use of a market value approach in enacting the 1976 Attorneys' Fees Awards Act,94 the court
stated: "The purpose of Title VII's fee awards provision ... is to encourage the private enforcement of the civil rights laws. While some
lawyers would assist in the private enforcement of Title VII for a reduced fee, congress has recognized that payment of full fees will provide greater enforcement incentives."95

90. See discussion in Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244·50 (3d Cir. 1977). See
also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980)(representation by public interest group is not a "special circumstance" that should result in denial of counsel fees in
Title VII action); Oldman v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1980)(§ 1988); Dennis v. Chang,
611 F.2d 1302, 1309 (9th Cir. 1980)(Titie VII); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975] 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 244 (C.D. Cal. 1974)(Title VII).
91. Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978), reh. denied, [1979] 20 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 79 (D.C. Cir.); rev'd en bane, [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir.).
92. Copeland v. Marshall, [1979]20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 79, 80 (D.C. Cir.). See also
Page v. Presser, 468 F. Supp. 399 (D.C. Iowa 1979).
93. Copeland v. Marshall, [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 980 (D.C. Cir.).
94. S. REP. No. lOll, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 5913, citing with approval, Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975] 8 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 244, 246 (C.D. Cal. 1974). In Davis, the court held, "[IJt is in the interest of the
public that public interest law firms be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees to be computed
in the traditional manner...•" [d. at 246.
95. Copeland v. Marshall, [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 973 (D.C. Cir.).
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In general, however, with or without a Copeland approach, trial
judges consistently have employed Johnson to reach fee determinations
which utterly fail to reflect either the complexity of Title VII litigation
or the Congressional policy underlying the Act's fee provisions. The
resulting two-tiered structure of fee awards in complex federal litigation has been observed to constitute, in effect, judicial legislation of
priorities among federal statutes.
[I]n both cases [public interest and antitrust] courts are
proceeding under Congressionally enacted attorneys' fees
provisions designed to encourage private enforcement of the
underlying statutory policies. One searches in vain for any expression by Congress of the relative importance of private
antitrust versus private civil rights enforcement. Yet the
courts have provided far more attractive financial inducements for lawyers to represent private antitrust
claimants. If judgments about the relative importance of differing statutory rates are to be made, those judgments should
be made deliberately by Congress, not unwittingly by courts
in the process of fixing attorneys' fees. 96
Ironically, the Title VII plaintiffs' bar may have contributed to this
"judicial legislation" by failing to seek aggressively fees which truly
reflect the value of their services.97
In recent years, however, Title VII litigators have increasingly extended the focus of their work beyond substantive interpretation of the
Act to efforts to secure the compensation necessary to pursue a continuing Title VII practice.98 In light of the almost certain cut-back in public

96 Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees. supra note 9. at 293. See also Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher. 64 F.R.D. 680. 682 (N.D. Cal. 1974). in which Judge Peckham stated that "[t]he rationale of rewarding reasonable attorneys' fee. after all. springs from the need for placing
the legal defense of certain constitutional principles and some Congressional policies on an
equal footing with the protection of private interests" (citation omitted).
97. As one judge noted in a recent Title VII case:
The parties have not discussed the point. but the fee in this case was contingent in the most extreme sense of the word. Plaintiffs' counsel will receive no
more than awarded by this court. and had it been requested this consideration
would have justified a serious notion of augmentation of the award.... The plaintiffs will be satisfied if they receive approximately what they have requested. so
no multiplier has been applied ....
Allen v. Terminal Transp. Co.• 486 F. Supp. 1195. 1198 (N.D. Ga. 1980)(emphasis added). See
also Prandini v. National Tea Co.• 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1972)(plaintiffs requested $60/hour);
Schaeffer v. Yellow Cabs. Inc .• 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972)(plaintiffs did not request fees
for appeal); Gay v. Board of Trustees. San Jacinto College. [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1570 (S.D. Tex.)(attorney voluntarily discounted hourly rate for routine services).
98. This may be attributable to the cutback in foundation funding of public interest
litigation. and to the movement of Title VII attorneys out of the public interest firms in
which they have been concentrated and into the private practice of law. One recent survey
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enforcement of Title VII under the Reagan administration, proper
judicial implementation of Title VII's fees awards provisions is of paramount importance to the survival of the evolving Title VII bar .99
The Lindy formula complements and organizes the Johnson
guidelines into a structure which best achieves this objective. In
recognition of its advantages, courts increasingly have adopted a Lindy
approach in computing fee awards in Title VII and other public interest
cases.IOO First, as a practical matter, Lindy does not splinter assessment
of the circumstances surrounding a case into far more units than is efficient or sensible. Many of the twelve Johnson factors overlap, or represent different aspects of the same basic consideration. Johnson factor
number five, for example, the "customary hourly fee," reflects virtually
every other Johnson factor. By contrast, the Lindy formula focuses on
four critical and relatively discrete areas of inquiry: (1) hours worked; (2)
the reasonable hourly rate to be applied to these hours; (3) adjustment
reflecting the contingency nature of the case; and (4) adjustment reflecting exceptional quality of representation.
More importantly, Lindy prioritizes among these four considerations: (1) Market value compensation for all hours reasonably spent in
the client's interest; and (2) augmentation of a base "hours-times-rate"
figure by a multiplier reflecting the contingent, lengthy nature of complex litigation, and concomitant delay in receipt of a fee. This ranking
of employment discrimination suits on file in the Northern District of California from 1973
to 1978 found that over half of all cases culminating in decrees were litigated by legal aid
societies, public interest firms and/or the EEOC, and that many other cases were handled
by former employees of these organizations. Chatty, supra note 37, at 10. See also COUNCIL
FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW IN AMERICA (1976).
99. President Reagan's "EEOC transition team" recently recommended that a oneyear freeze on EEOC litigation be imposed, together with substantial cutbacks in the agency's budget. Reagan's Advisors, supra note 29.
100. See Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 973-74 (D.C.
Cir.)(expressly adopts the Lindy formula in calculating attorney's fees under "statutes like
Title VIr'); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 636-38
(6th Cir. 1979)(§ 1988 case adopting hours-times-rate formula, with upward adjustment of
rate to account for contingency nature of case); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603
F.2d 598, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1979)(Title VII case adopting hours-times-rate formula, adjusted by
other ABA Code of Professional Responsibility factors, including contingency nature of case,
results obtained, and quality of representation); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 639
(8th Cir.1979)(action brought under Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C.
§ 621, adopting Johnson modified by "lodestar" approach). See also Merchandise Nat'l Bank
of Chicago v. Scanlon, 86 Ill. App. 3d 719, 408 N.E.2d 248 (1980)(truth in lending action which
applies Lindy rather than Johnson); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 471 (3d Cir.
1978)(Title VII case adopting Lindy formula!; Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978)
(§ 1988 case adopting use of formula established by Lindy and another antitrust case, Merola
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.1975)); Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
[1981]24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(Title VII case adopting Johnson factors but utilizing Lindy approach); Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980)(§ 1988 case
adopting Lindy approach); see generally LARSEN, supra note 15.
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requires courts to focus on the most important principles which in turn
serves as an incentive for attorneys to undertake complex, lengthy
litigation.

A. Lindy Emphasis on Input Rather Than ResultsA Necessary Approach in Title VII Fee Setting
The Lindy formula is predicated upon compensation of successful
plaintiffs' attorneys on the basis of their input in a case, rather than on
the monetary results of the litigation. Hence, the base fee is normally
the product of all attorney hours actually expended on the case, times
the market value of those hours. As noted in a recent survey of awards
under Lindy in the commercial cases in which it is customarily
employed, "the disallowance of claimed time is the exception rather
than the rule."lol
This approach is consistent with the congressional directives
governing calculation of fees in Title VII cases. First, "[i]n computing
the fee, counsel for prevailing party should be paid, as is traditional
with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time
reasonably expended on a matter.' " Secondly, "[i]t is intended that the
amount of fees ... not be reduced because the rights involved may be
non-pecunicary in nature."102
Lindy's de-emphasis on the results of a successful action is critical
in the Title VII area. The formula directs the court to consider "results"
only when determining whether the base hours-times-rate "lodestar"
should be adjusted in light of the exceptionally good or bad quality of
the legal representation. As later clarified in Lindy II, this adjustment
reflects both: (1) the results obtained, in an absolute sense and relative
to the possible recovery; and (2) an evaluation of the professional
behavior of the attorney in the particular case. 103 The Lindy formula
does not allow the court's evaluation of the results to affect its determination of the "reasonable hourly rate" in the lodestar, instead basing
this figure solely on the market value of the services of the attorney as
a general matter in cases of this type.
The Johnson formula, by contrast, contains as one of its twelve,
equally weighted fee determinants, consideration of the "amount involved and the results obtained."lo4 Although the decision does recognize the
importance of rewarding injunctive relief in the across-the-board
discrimination cases, it does not otherwise discuss the practical difficulties of a result-orientation, particularly one focusing on monetary
101. Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, supra note 9, at 131.
102. S. REP. No. lOll, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 59131.
103. Lindy II, 540 F.2d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 1976).
104. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (1976). See also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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results, in Title VII cases. These problems arise as a result of Title VII's
statutory emphasis on injunctive remedies necessary to eradicate
employment discrimination throughout the economy. Consistent with
that scheme, Title VII monetary relief is of an entirely equitable nature,
limited to back pay extending back to a date not more than two years
prior to the filing of an administrative charge w.ith the EEOC.lo5 As a
result, relief orders in Title VII cases tend to yield limited outright
monetary gain, in striking" contrast to the t-reble damages awards
authorized under the Clayton Act.loS
Many courts utilizing Johnson have focused their fee determination on the money damages yielded in the case, to the plaintiff's detriment. The first circuit recently reversed one such decision rejecting
the lower court's stated policy of imposing a fifty-percent-of-monetaryrecovery ceiling on attorneys' fee awards under the 1976 Attorneys'
Fees Awards Act. lo7 The circuit court noted that the trial court's interpretation of the Act ignores the reality that even actions for solely
monetary damages vindicate the principle of civil rights, and that a fixed percentage ceiling discourages private enforcement of civil rights
acts. IOS Courts in Title VII cases often purport to de-emphasize the im105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). The legislative history of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 indicates that this limitation on back pay was imposed to roughly
paralIel statutes of limitations on actions in other areas.
Under existing law, recovery of back pay in such pattern or practice suits
can extend back to 1965, the effective date of enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Thus potential respondents .•. may be subject to enormous monetary
penalties in the absence of a definite limitation. To avoid the litigation of stale
charges and to preclude respondents from being subject to indefinite liabilities, it
is clear that a precise statute of limitation is needed. In view of the tremendous
backlog currently existing at the EEOC, and the failure to require a prompt service of the charge on named respondents ••• equitable principles require a limitation on liability.
H.R. REP. No. 938, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
2175.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See also H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976):
Of course, it should be noted that the mere recovery of damages should not
preclude the awarding of counsel fees •••. Furthermore, while damages are
theoreticalIY available under the statute covered by [the Fees Act] it should be
observed that, in some cases immunity doctrines and special defenses, available
only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damages remedy. Consequently, awarding counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such litigation is particularly important and necessary if Federal, civil, and constitutional rights are to
be adequately protected. To be sure, in a large number of cases brought under
the provisions covered by [the Fees Act] only injunctive relief is sought, and
prevailing plaintiffs should ordinarily recover their counsel fees ....
107. Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980).
108. Id. But see Harrington V. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 197 (6th
Cir. 1978)(trial court upheld in refusing to award fees to Title VII plaintiff who established
violation of her rights but because of peculiar circumstances in the case was unable to
establish a right to relief!. Contra, EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp.
381 (D. Minn. 1980).
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portance of monetary results/o9 but nevertheless calculate Title VII
awards at levels which reflect concern over this factor.110
Even under a Lindy analysis, plaintiffs' attorneys must anticipate
that courts will continue to be reluctant to award large fees in cases
which do not on their face appear to yield large monetary benefits to
the class. Title VII a~torneys have recently attempted to address this
problem by evaluating for the court the financhl.l consequences of the affirmative injunctive relief yielded by an order or decree. For example,
goal and time-tables for accelerated hiring promotion, and/or training of
affected class members, a common feature in Title VII remedial orders,
ca:n be evaluated by an expert to ascertain their monetary value over at
least the time-period of the court's continuing supervision of the case. In
a recent nationwide sex discrimination case, 111 the settlement's goals
and timetables were conservatively evaluated at $18 million over a fiveyear period, and at $56 million over a ten-year period. 112
B.

Contingency Multiplier-An Essential Consideration in Calculating
Title VII Fees

Johnson factor number six directs trial courts to consider the "contingency" as opposed to "fixed nature" of the fee. As explained by the
Johnson court, however, this factor is seen as relevant only to the question of ·the attorney's original assessment of the prospects of the case. 113
Subsequent decisions have generaly rejected this analysis as either incorrect or, more importantly, as irrelevant to calculation of the fair
market value of the fee award.n 4
109. Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 986 (D.C. Cir.). See
also Chicano Police Officers' Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980)(acknowledging
propriety of fee award in recognition of substantial subjunctive relief); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 519 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1979)(same); Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp.
973 (D.D.C. 1977)(same); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975]8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 244
(C.D. Cal. 1974)(same).
110. See notes 9, 10 & accompanying text supra.
111. Declaration of Guy Saperstein in support of Motion for Award of Attorneys'
Fees and Costs, Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1190 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
112. Expert evaluation of injunctive relief has long been successfully utilized in both
public interest and antitrust cases to support fee awards. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 501 F.
Supp. 403 (C.D. Ca. 1980)(replacement housing provided by defendants valued at $230,000
million; rapid transit facilities valued at over $100,000 million); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975)(trial court should consider expert testimony evaluating
dollar value of three·year commercial leases as compared to one-year leases); Arenson v.
Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1974)(expert testimony admitted concerning value to brokers of elimination of fixed-rate schedule).
113. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974).
114. See Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1980); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d
483 (3d Cir. 1978); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1976); Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 441 F. Supp. 846
(W.D.N.C. 1977). But see Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979)(prevailing single-
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By contrast, the Lindy formula places great emphasis on the
substantial upward adjustment of a basic hours-times-rate award
("lodestar") by a multiplier reflecting, in part, the contingent nature of
success of the case.ns As elaborated in Lindy II, this factor requires trial
court appraisal of: (1) the plaintiffs' burden in the case, given its complexity, and the chances of success on liability and recovery of damages;
(2) the risks assumed by the plaintiffs in developing the case, including
the number of attorney-hours risked without guarantee of payment and
the amount of out-of-pocket expenses necessarily advanced for the case;
and (3) the delay in receipt of payment for the services rendered. lI8
Commentators in both the commercial and public interest fields
have stressed the importance of the contingency factor as an inducement to attract plaintiffs' attorneys to undertake this arduous and risky
work. In one recent study of commercial class actions, the reporter emphasized that the risks of contingent fee litigation are cumulative, and
include both the general risks of losing even the best cases, and the
specific risks of obtaining class certification, prevailing on liability and
obtaining damages. The reporter concluded: "In order for a rational
plaintiffs class action attorney to undertake a case with only an even
chance of success, he must have a reasonable expectation of being
awarded double the fee that he would receive in a case almost certain of
success."117
As discussed in Part II above, Title VII cases are arguably far
riskier than their commercial counterparts. Not only are they enormously complex, lengthy, and costly, but they are also rarely, if ever,
preceded by relevant governmental or other legal action against the
same defendant, a common advantag.e in the commercial area. These
risks are substantially enhanced by the rapidly changing and conflicting
state of the case law, and the general inability of Title VII clients to advance even minimal costs.1l8 Also, the plaintiffs attorney is often pitted
against financially secure defendants with retained counsel.
Added to these risks is the very real danger that the attorney will
be financially destroyed by the burden of deferred compensation. Title
VII private practitioners tend to be relatively isolated in small practices
which lack both the solid financial and experiential base of plaintiffs'
antitrust firms. They, therefore, pursue their work to the almost total
plaintiff not entitled to attorney's fees where action enforced single violation of private
rights; presence of contingency fee agreement possible indication that attorney perceived
case to have "bright [financial] prospects" and, therefore, needed no incentive to undertake
it). See also Comment, Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, U. CHI. L. REV. 332 (1980).
115. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 468.
116. Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 116-17.
117. Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, supra note 9, at 133-34; see also Court
Awarded Attorneys' Fees, supra note 9, at 324-26.
118. United States v. Operating Eng'rs, [1974]6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 985, 987(N.D.
Cal. 1973).
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exclusion of other, non-contingency cases, and have no capital base from
which to draw salary and overhead pending final outcome of their contingency cases.ll9
Although the Johnson formula does not recognize Lindy's "contingency" multiplier approach, courts increasingly have taken this factor into account in calculating fee awards in public interest cases.l2Q
Nevertheless, while awarding contingency multipliers which double, triple or quadruple the "lodestar" in commercial cases,121 judges are reluctant to apply multiples of even ten percent to fifty percent in Title VII
actions.122
This reluctance has produced precisely the unfortunate result
presaged by a district court in 1974, which held that:
[The] contingent fee . . . allows attorneys-including attorneys who could not otherwise absorb the costs of lost
cases-to take the financial gamble of representing penurious
clients, since, over the long run, substantial fees awards in
successful cases will provide full and fair compensation for all
legal services rendered to all clients. From the public's standpoint, the contingent fee helps equalize the access of rich,
119. See note 10 supra.
120. See Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 441 F. Supp. 846, 849 (W.D.N.C. 1977)(expressly basing "incentive award" on protracted, contingency nature of Title VII casel;
Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981]24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190, 1190-91 (N.D.
Cal. 1980)(purportedly using Johnson, but applying multiplier of 1.50 which reflected in part
the protracted nature of contingency litigation); Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir.l(expressly adopting the Lindy contingency multiplier).
Some courts reject the concept of a contingency multiplier, and instead inflate the
reasonable rate to account for the contingency factor. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611
F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.s. 911 (1980).
121. See.In Re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1974)(contingency
multiplier of three); Arenson v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill.
1974)(multiplier of four); Goldstein v. Alodex Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa.
1973)(multiplier of five); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973)(multiplier of two even though criminal prosecutions preceded case and additional fees were received through private contingent fee contracts).
122. See Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., [1981]24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190,
1191 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(multiplier of only 1.50 in successfully settled nationwide class action
against a major defendant); Neely v. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir.
1980)(augmentation of fee held appropriate in light of such factors as contingency nature of
case, when litigation corrected across-the-board discrimination affecting a large class);
Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1979)(reducing from
50% to 25% multiplier applied by trial court to reflect contingent nature of fees and quality
of representation); Love v. Pullman, EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH)(19 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 1 9167
at 7046 (D.C. Colo. 1979)(no contingency multiplier in successful major Title VII class action
which went to United States Supreme Court on grounds that factors justifying incentive
fee were already reflected in the twelve Johnson considerations); Parker v. Matthews, 411
F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976) a/I'd, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1976)("incentive fee" of 25% appropriate to reflect contingency and three other factors).
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middle-class, and poor individuals to the courts by making attorney decisions concerning representation turn on an
action's merits rather than on the size of a client's income.
Courts' application of the doctrine in the aid of a 'private attorneys general' helps attract attorneys to the enforcement of
important constitutional policies which might otherwise go
unrepresented (citation omitted).l23
Judge Peckham's decision in the above case was one of those cited with
approval in the Senate Report on the 1976 Attorney's Act as reflecting
proper judicial application of standards in the computation of fee
awards under civil rights acts, including Title VII.124
In light of both the Congressional policy underlying Title VII and
its fees provisions, and the harsh realities of the prosecution of employment discrimination litigation, the Lindy enhancement approach to contingency fee litigation is a necessity. Perhaps the highest multiplier
ever awarded in a public interest case, a 3.5 percent multiplier awarded
in Keith v. Volpe,125 was based explicitly upon the court's acknowledgement of the extraordinary length, complexity, and difficulty of the case,
absence of a fee-paying client, and uncertainty of success on the merits
at the outset. Close examination and recognition of these factors is implicit in the Lindy approach. This recognition, in conjunction with the
other advantages of the Lindy method of fee calculation discussed
above, clearly recommended its use by all courts in calculating Title VII
attorney's fees awards.
V.

ApPLICATION OF LINnYIN THE TITLE

VII CONTEXT

Two questions are of particular importance in judicial application
of the Lindy formula in the Title VII context. First, should prevailing
plaintiffs' attorneys be compensated for labor on issues on which the
plaintiff did not ultimately prevail? Secondly, what is the "reasonable
hourly rate" to be applied to the labor of attorneys whose billing rates
fail to reflect the market rate for legal work of similar complexity, duration and risk?

A.

Compensation for Unsuccessful Work

The circuit courts are split on the question of whether or not hours
spent by prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys on ultimately unsuccessful
claims are compensable. Some courts, typified by the District of Columbia circuit, refuse to compensate these hours, often without discussion.126
123. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 685 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
124. S. REP, No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5912, 5913
125. Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
126. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, [1980] 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 975 (D.C.
Cir.); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, 597 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1980); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp.,
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The ostensible rationale for this reduction is that it would impose an unfair burden on the defendant and/or would constitute a windfall to the
plaintiffs attorney.l27 Many courts temper this position in cases in which
the plaintiff fails to prevail on one of several alternative legal theories
originally advanced to remedy essentially the same conduct, or where
the successful claim was inextricably related to claims on which the
plaintiff did prevail. Unless the claims are truly fractionable, these
courts award compensation for all hours reasonably related to the
primary successful thrust of the action, even though these same services may also have supported prosecution of other, unsuccessful
theories. 128 Some courts have firmly rejected the narrow view, however,
insisting that prevailing plaintiffs be compensated for all time
reasonably calculated to advance the client's interest. l29 Many of these
courts have relied on the legislative history of the 1976 Attorneys' Fees
597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979); Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183, 187 (7th
Cir. 1979); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972). But see
Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1026·27 (5th Cir. 1979) reh. ordered, 602 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.
1979)(award should be proportionate to extent plaintiff prevails but court should consider
net result of efforts).
127. See, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1027 (5th Cir. 1979) reh. ordered,602
F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1979)(defendants should not have to pay for claims which lack the merit
of some basis in fact or law).
128. Copeland v. Marshall, [1980]23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 967, 975 n.18 (D.C. Cir.)(Ti·
tie VII) no rigid percentage reduction for unsuccessful claim where unsuccessful "issue was
all part and parcel of one matter"); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1979);
Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 1978)(§ 1988)(compensation appropriate for all
hours reasonably supportive of successful claims and necessary to overall success, even if
hours also supported unsuccessful claims); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir.
1978)(Title VII)(mechanical percentage reduction .for unsuccessful claims not appropriate in
absence of close scrutiny of actual hours necessarily expended on prevailing claims); Wright
v. Heizer Corp., 503 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1980)(shareholders' derivative action)(appropriate to compensate all hours reasonably related to primary thrust of case). The United
States Supreme Court lent support to this approach, holding that fees ordinarily available
to plaintiffs who prevail on constitutional claims should not be denied because a court has
held for plaintiff on statutory, rather than constitutional grounds. This policy, said the
Court, "furthers the Congressional goal of encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional
rights without undermining the long·standing judicial policy of avoiding unnecessary deci·
sion of important constitutional issues." Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 133 (1980)(§ 1988).
See also, Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980). This principle also found express
approval in the House of Representatives Report on the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Act
of 1976, H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976).
129. See, e.g., Sherkow v. Wisconsin Dep't of Pub. Instruction, [1980] 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 939 (7th Cir.)(Titie VII); Johnson v. Nordstrom·Larpenteur Agency, 623 F.2d
1279 (8th Cir. 1980)(Title VII); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980)(§ 1988); Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 987 (1978)(§ 1988); Allen v. Terminal Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp.
1195, 1201 (N.D. Ga. 1980)(Title VII); Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'I v. United Airlines, 480 F.
Supp. 1107, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, [1975]8 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 244 (C.D. Cal. 1974)(Title VII); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal.
1974)("private attorney general").
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Awards Act, citing the language of the Senate Report: "In computing
the fee, the counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time
reasonably expended on a matter.' "130
Denial of compensation for ultimately unsuccessful claims has the
practical effect of subverting this congressional policy by undercompensating attorneys who undertake public interest litigation. As noted by
one court: "We know of no 'traditional' method of billing whereby an attorney offers a discount based upon his or her failure to prevail on
'issues or parts of issues.' "131 The economic burden of pursuing Title VII
litigation thereby is shifted from the defendant- discriminator to the
plaintiff-victim, who has succeeded in vindicating both individual and
public rights under the civil rights laws.
The probable effect of the rule is two-fold in the Title VII context.
First, attorneys will be discouraged from taking the risky and difficult
Title VII cases in the first instance. If attorneys know that in all
likelihood they will not receive full compensation for the hours they
have necessarily devoted to a complex Title VII case on which they
prevail in part, many instead will choose to engage in litigation which is
not subject to this "public interest discount." This result runs directly
counter to the central purpose of the fee-shifting provisions of the Act.
Second, contrary to congressional mandate, lawyers who do litigate Title VII cases will be discouraged from pursuing all but the most
straight-forward claims and theories.132 Ironically, it is the lawyers who
undertake the most important class actions to enforce the Act that bear
the brunt of this policy. Class action counsel are ethically bound to initially pursue all theories which appear warranted at the outset of the
litigation. Unlike their peers in more pedestrian practice, they are not
able to secure informed consent from their class "client" to narrow the
action to the easier issues. These lawyers constitute the backbone of the
Title VII bar, yet are subjected to the largest disincentives to continue
in this capacity.
The growth in the numbers and sophistication of the defense bar
coupled with the increasingly conservative bent of not only the
Supreme Court, but also the legislative and executive branches as well,
insure that this issue will assume even greater importance in the future.
The recent Reagan transition-team report on the EEOC highlights the
paramount importance of courts providing the maximum 'possible incen130. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5913. See, e.g., Northcross V. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980)(§ 1988); Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 987 (1978)(§ 1988).
131. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,447
U.S. 911 (1980).
132. [d.
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tives to attorneys who are capable of handling this increasingly uphill
work. Included in the recommendations of the task force are:
A one-year freeze on law suits by the EEOC;
(2) Imposition of the requirement of proof of intent to
discriminate in order to prove violation of Title VII;
(3) Legalization of use of pre-employment screening devices,
long held to disparately affect women and/or minorities
without being justified by business necessity; and
(4) Abandonment of EEOC use of hiring and promotional
goals in settling charges. l33
(1)

The Lindy emphasis on the reasonable input of the attorneys,
rather than on the results of the litigation, is fully consistent with a role
requiring compensation for all time reasonably expended in the client's
interest. Moreover, Title VII cases do not present the troublesome
issues created by implementation of this rule in the "common fund/substantial benefit" cases. The fees involved are assessed against the
defendant law-violator rather than taken from the class which received
no monetary benefits from the services in question. Additionally, the
spillover in benefits of a partial victory for the class in Title VII cases,
which focus on equitable relief, may be far greater than that in antitrust
cases, which focus on monetary compensation to the class.
B. Establishing a Reasonable Hourly Rate for Title VII Attorneys

Perhaps the most difficult task facing attorneys and courts in applying Lindy is the determination of the "lodestar" reasonable hourly
rate. Two aspects of the problem will be discussed below. First, the
court must adopt the appropriate standard for determining the
reasonable rate for each attorney's labor on the case. Second, the court
must consider the impact of inflation on historic hourly rates which
would have been billed and collected in earlier years of prolonged litigation, but which are not actually assessed by the court and paid until
years later at the conclusion of the case.
As contemplated by Lindy and its progeny, the "reasonable hourly
rate" factor of the lodestar represents the rate normally charged for
non-contingent work of similar complexity by lawyers in the community
who have experience, reputation, and ability comparable to that of the
plaintiffs' attorney.134 In antitrust and other commercial litigation, this
figure is ordinarily reflected in the attorney's normal billing rate. 13S This
index is inappropriate in the Title VII area because Title VII attorneys
do not normally charge their clients fees which reflect the market value
133. Reagan's Advisors, supra note 29.
134. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities, 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
135. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 167.
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of their skills. Reference to the billing rates of other Title VII or public
interest lawyers in the community yields a similarly defective result. In
light of the legislative history of Title VII's fee provisions, as clarified in
the Senate Report on the 1976 Attorneys' Fees Awards Act/ 36 courts
must instead devise indices for hourly rates in Title VII cases which
reflect the "same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases ...."137
In attempting to arrive at a fair market value for the work of
public interest lawyers, courts have often relied on affidavits or declarations filed by both the petitioning attorney and by respected practitioners in the community.13s The plaintiffs attorney's affidavit states the
attorney's legal background, experience, and special expertise in Title
VII and other complex federal litigation. The affidavits of lawyers from
the community may address the plaintiffs attorney's level of expertise
and legal reputation in the community, stating the average hourly rate
charged by the lawyers of similar expertise and reputation for representation of clients in similarly complex, non-contingent federal litigation
over the period of time spanned by the case. These attorneys often cite
their own or their law firm's billing rates, where such rates are reflective of the market value of services similar to those of the petitioning
attorney.
The affidavit-method described above is cumbersome and expensive, particularly for attorneys who are not well-connected in the local
legal community. It may also subject the affiants to detailed discovery
by. defendants, probing into the affiant's billing practices and those of
his or her firm in specific cases. At least two possible solutions to this
problem have been attempted.
First, plaintiffs' attorneys have directed courts to consider the fees
charged by opposing counsel in the case under submission.139 Courts are
divided on the question of the relevance and materiality of the defendants' counsel fees in establishing the market value of the plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts. One trial court, for example, found that Johnson provides a mandate for plaintiffs' discovery of the rates of opposing counsel
because these attorneys were most intimately involved in the litigation
136. The Senate Report states: "It is intended that the standards for awarding fees
[under the 1976 Act] be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5912.
137. Id. The Fifth Circuit recently expressly applied the principles of the Senate
Report in evaluating a Johnson-based fee calculation in Title VII case. Neely V. City of
Grenada, 624 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1980).
138. See, e.g., Neely V. City of Grenada, 624 F.2d 547, 550-51 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980)(examples of attorney affidavits).
139. Plaintiffs have also attempted to submit evidence of defense hours as probative
of the number of hours reasonably spent in the case. See cases cited in notes 140 & 141 infra.
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at issue. 140 Other courts have rejected as irrelevant evidence of the
defense billing rate.l41
Defense counsel's billing rates logically and legally may be the
most probative evidence readily available to the court in determining
the reasonable market rate of the efforts of plaintiffs' attorneys of
similar experience levels. Congress implicitly authorized judicial
reference to these rates in enacting the 1976 Attorneys' Fees Awards
Act, by acknowledging with approval in the Senate Report the standards utilized in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, a
case in which "fees paid to opposing counsel" was one of nine factors on
which the trial court based its fee computations. 142
Possible objections to the discovery and admission of such
evidence are clearly outweighed by its probative value. Claims of
privilege, for example, are far less compelling arguments for defense
counsel in the case than for outside attorneys who may subject
themselves to defense discovery by attesting to their own fees in cases
wholly unrelated to that before the court. Furthermore, courts can easily meet defense objections by subjecting information regarding defense
fees to a protective order. Some courts' reluctance to consider defense
counsel fees as probative of the value of plaintiffs' counsel's services
may reflect an implicit value judgment that public interest attorneys
simply do not expect or deserve to be paid the rates prevailing in large
establishment law firms.143 To the extent that this view is based on
anything other than the actual quality and complexity of the legal work
performed by the specific attorney involved, it is clearly proscribed by
governing case law. 144
In light of the time and expense of litigating the reasonable rate
issue, it has been suggested that district courts approach the problem
by enacting district-wide local rules which establish the upper and lower
boundaries of a fee spectrum. 145 The district would first conduct an an140. Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552, 563 (N.D. Ga. 1979). The
court found defendant's fees to be particularly relevant in light of Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), which held unconstitutional the minimum fee schedule ad·
vocated by the Johnson court. ld. at 563 n.6. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc.,
488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 F.R.D.
662,663-64 (W.D.N.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980); Swann v.
Charlotte·Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483, 485 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
141. See, e.g., Samuel v. University of Pitt., 80 F.R.D. 293, 295-96 (W.D. Pa. 1978l;
Nirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 576 F.2d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
142. 66 F.R.D. 483, 485 (W.D.N.C. 1975), cited in S. REP. No. lOll, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976J U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5913.
143. One court has noted to the contrary, that "the extent to which defendants may
have obtained high.priced legal counsel is relevant to show the reasonableness of plaintiffs
in hiring high·priced counsel." Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552, 564
(N.D. Ga. 1979).
144. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
145. This and other suggestions to reduce the uncertainties of fee litigation and
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nual survey of rates charged by attorneys employed in litigation similar
to that giving rise to court-awarded attorneys' fees, stratified by difficulty level and experience level. Based on the findings, the resulting
fee spectrum would presumptively limit the court's discretion in
calculating a fee. H6
Whatever their disadvantages, both of these controversial
methods of establishing plaintiffs' attorneys' reasonable rates have the
effect of requiring courts to consider plaintiffs' attorneys' labor in public
interest cases on a par with that of counsel in complex commerical
litigation who are paid on a contemporaneous basis.
The second major problem courts face when determining a
reasonable hourly rate for Title VII attorneys is the need to adjust
rates to reflect the monetary effects of prolonged delay in receipt of
payment of fee. Although many courts purport to correct for delay by
augmenting the contingency multiplier,H7 this factor involves a separate
consideration which is more properly and easily dealt with in the context of the reasonable rate issue.
The delay factor logically diminishes the value of the fee when
finally paid in two ways. First, the effects of inflation devalue each
dollar ultimately awarded. Seconp, the attorney loses, the investment or
interest income that could have been earned on the deferred compensation. These factors are illustrated by a recent survey of 186 fee awards
in antitrust and securities class actions. The survey noted that the Consumer Price Index rose between 1971 and 1979 by approximately 79%.148
Therefore, a dollar in October, 1973 was worth only fifty-eight cents in
February 1980. The survey's authors further cited a recent survey of
lawyers' fees in large cities which demonstrated that the average increase in the median hourly rate charged by attorneys between 1971
and 1979 approximated the rate of increase in the Consumer Price Index.u9 The authors note:
Particularly for more recent cases, a multiple of 1.5 or 2.0 is
not infrequently necessary just for successful plaintiffs'
counsel to neutralize the time factor . . .. [B]y the time a fee
is awarded, inflation has reduced its value by an average of
thereby to encourage settlement, are contained in a letter dated May 6, 1980 from John T.
Hansen, Esq. to the Chairs of the San Francisco Bar Association's Federal Courts Committee (reprinted as Appendix V to this article).
146. Id.
147. Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., [1981] 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1190, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Weiss v. Drew Nat'l
Corp., 465 F. Supp. 548, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v.
Taylor, 82 F.R.D. 405, 412 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
148. Antitrust and Security Class Actions, supra note 9, at 83.
149. Ia. See also Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980}(court adopts hourly
rates for senior attorney which increased from $50.00 per hour in 1971 to $117.50 per hour
in 1979).
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21.3%. Thus in the average case, a multiple of 1.27 is required
just to offset inflation, and a further mUltiple in the same
range would be necessary to counter the interest loss
factor. lso

Similar adjustments for projected future inflation are commonly
applied by courts in personal injury law suits. As stated by one court:
"[lJt is inconsistent with economic reality and grossly unfair to the plaintiff to ignore the effects of inflation upon a damage award .... While
the administrative convenience of ignoring inflation when the rates are
high is to ignore economic reality."151 These cases stress that future inflation is not speculative, but rather, it is capable of definition and
prediction by economic experts, and must be considered if victims are to
be fully compensated. This logic is considerably more persuasive in the
context of computation of fee awards, since relevant rates of historic
inflation are a matter of public record rather than future speculation. If
courts are to fully implement the congressional purpose of Title VII's
fee award provisions, some adjustment for inflation and/or interest must
be made in lengthy cases.
Courts are divided, however, in their approach to the problem.
Some courts simply refuse to make any accommodations at all to this
factor. 152 Others "inflate" historic, or past, hourly rates for each month
or year of the litigation by application of an indicator like the Consumer
Price Index l53 to reach the current dollar value of each individual past
rate. l54 Alternatively, some judges have recognized the advantages of
correcting for inflation by applying current hourly rates to all hours expended in the litigation at any time. 155 This method allows compensation
for both the loss of interest and inflation. Nor is this approach overly
generous; as one court noted: "if we used historic rates and added to
150. Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, supra note 9.
151. United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 74-75 (9th Cir_ 1975). See also Sauers v.
Alaska Barge, 600 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1979).
152. See Kinsey v. Legg Mas9n Wood Walker, (1980) 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 773,
776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1978), where the court refused to award an interest rate on fees stemming
from approximately seven years of litigation.
153. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. DEP'T OF LABOR, Consumer Price Index for
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, U.S. City Average, All Items, in CPI DETAILED REPORT-JAN. 1981 DATA (March 1971) at Table 7.
154. See, e.g., Parker v. Califano, 443 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D.D.C. 1978), where the court
stated: "multiplying the $65/hour rate by the current Gross National Product deflator factor for 1975-1.110-results in a current value of $72/hour, which the Court finds to be fair
and reasonable compensation").
155. Lindy I/, 504 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976)(current rates applied); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 61.887 (D. Conn. 1978)(dictum endorsing use of
current rates)(court stated "attorneys are ordinarily justified in 'seeking payment of past
charges in terms of present dollar values' "); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D.
395 (D.D.C. 1978)(uses current rates because it simplifies calculation and "roughly counterbalances inflation").
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them compensation for interest and inflation, the Court would add far
more than the 5-11% difference between a calculation of the hours at
.the two different rates."158
VI.

CONCLUSION

Enforcement of Title VII depends largely on effective litigation by
victims of discrimination acting in the capacity of "private attorneys
genera!." This function, in turn, 'is realized only if the Act's fee-shifting
provisions are liberally construed to yield fee awards at a level which
encourages attorneys to undertake Title VII cases. This principle finds
clear expression in the legislative history applicable to the Act, as most·
succinctly articulated in the Senate Report on the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976.157 That Report directs Title VII
courts to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys pursuant to the same standards as those employed in other areas of complex federal litigation; to
calculate these awards on the same basis as fees billed by private practitioners, for all time reasonably spent on the case; to fully recognize and
compensate injunctive relief; and to adjust the award to compensate for
the complexity, length and risk of the case. l58
Judicial response to this legislative imperative has produced a contrary result. Fees awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII cases are
customarily calculated at minimal levels reflecting judicial disregard for
the determinants stressed by Congress and lack of recognition of the
enormous costs in hours and dollars of federal litigation which is of maximum complexity and risk. Awards under the Act compare so unfavorably to those made in other areas of complex federal litigation as
to impute to federal judges a view of civil rights as less deserving of
vindication than the economic rights secured by the antitrust and corporate securities acts.
Attorneys seeking to enforce judicial recognition and implementation of the congressional purpose underlying Title VII and its fees provisions must convince courts to employ a method of fee calculation
which most effectively compensates attorneys who undertake Title VII
cases. The multi-factor approach commonly employed by courts in
calculating Title VII fee awards 159 has proven disastrously inadequate to
the task. The factors themselves fail adequately to recognize and
reward either the contingent nature and delayed receipt of payment in
Title VII cases, or their enormous complexity and impact. The Johnson
156. City of New York v. Darling-Delaware, 440 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913.

158. Iii
159. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-18, Disciplinary
Rule 240-6 (B).
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approach also fragments judicial consideration of the circumstances surrounding each case, and provides no structure of priorities within which
to calculate an actual dollar amount. As a result, courts have been free
to acknowledge each of the factors in passing, while proceeding to exercise largely unreviewable discretion in calculating an inadequate
reward.
The formula established in Lindy/50 by contrast, requires judges to
predicate their awards on the attorneys' input in the case, compensated
at an hourly rate found to be reasonable for complex federal litigation,
and adjusted by a factor reflecting close scrutiny of the contingency
nature of the fee, delay in receipt of payment, and exceptional quality of
effort expended and result achieved in a particular case. Awards made
under Lindy are thereby focused upon the factors which most influence
an attorney's economic decision to undertake Title VII cases. Lindy
awards also subject the trial court's determination to focused appellate
review, insuring that the purposes underlying the fee-shifting provision
of the Act will be properly implemented by trial courts.
Trial judges must liberally implement Lindy in light of the broad
remedial purposes of Title VII. This requires affirmative response to
problem issues raised by litigation under the Act, including those posed
by determination of reasonable hourly rates, compensation for contingency nature and delayed receipt of payment of fee, and remuneration for the many hours necessarily expended on matters on which the
plaintiffs do not ultimately prevail. When properly implemented, Lindy
represents the best vehicle presently available to courts for calculating
reasonable Title VII attorneys' fees awards.
Trial court implementation of the Lindy formula in Title VII fee
calculations is obviously no panacea for the ills that afflict the Title VII
bar. Nevertheless, liberal application of the formula, in response to the
problems discussed above as well as those in other troublesome areas,
may yield fees sufficient to attract and support the highly skilled
attorneys required to prosecute effect Title VII litigation.
160. See notes 82-83 & asccompanying text supra for a discussion of the Lindy approach.

